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Important work has been done recently on operationalizing military pro-
tection of civilians. Initiatives by the UN, individual nations, and NGOs have
tried to translate the general mandate to protect civilians from attack and
abuse into specific strategic and tactical principles. Most of this work has
focused on how militaries ought to react to direct attacks on civilians, but
thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination
of the ways in which the approach of military organizations to the problem
of “spoiler” groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians -
where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations,
attempts to “dislodge” them may substantially increase the level of violence
against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near active
fighting.) In 2009, the UN supported the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s
military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR militia, at mas-
sive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on the UN’s failure to protect
civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics.
These criticisms are valid, but in this essay I argue that two additional consid-
erations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect
violence against civilians, and the way that moralizing the approach to armed
groups can limit military and political options for protecting civilians.
Introduction
Protection of civilians is a topic of intense discussion in peacekeeping circles, as well
as with respect to other operations that emphasize the creation of a stable security
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environment, such as security reform and stability operations.1 The concern is both
practical and moral. Practically, making civilians safe (and making sure they feel
safe) is a key component of “winning hearts and minds.” Morally, the presence
of peacekeepers seems to be justifiable, if at all, by the benefits in terms of peace
and security that they bring the local population. Even “traditional” peacekeeping
that focused on mediation and separation of states or organized armed factions was
ultimately justified in terms of the UN’s mission to save people from “the scourge of
war.”
Two issues have loomed large. First, how can peacekeeper mandates be strength-
ened so as to allow peacekeepers to more effectively protect civilians, especially when
force must be used? Second, if force is going to be used, how can peacekeepers do
so effectively? While peacekeepers protect civilians from abuses in many cases with-
out the use of force, cases in which armed groups have committed heinous abuses
loom large, and a great perceived weakness of peacekeeping forces has been their
unwillingness or inability to use coercion to rein in violent abusers.
The United Nations Mission in the Congo’s (MONUC) support to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) national army’s (FARDC) military operations against
the Forces Démocratiques de L’iberation du Rwanda (FDLR) throughout 2009 –
operation “Kimia II” – is an interesting case for thinking about civilian protection.
On paper, Kimia II may have looked like a prime example of what advocates for
more robust civilian protection have called for. The FDLR were (and are) involved
in serious human rights abuses in the DRC, and their core leadership is made up of
former members of the Rwandan regime that perpetrated the 1994 genocide there
— a very attractive target for aggressive peacekeeping operations. In addition, a
partnership between the UN and local forces, with locals taking the lead while the
UN provides logistical, intelligence, and planning support, looks like a plausible
and legitimate model for peacekeeping that verges on counterinsurgency, allowing
a distinct niche for the UN when force is used to protect civilians.
Nonetheless, MONUC’s involvement in Kimia II has been severely criticized, and
for good reason.2 Critics have argued that MONUC ought either to have used its
1See, e.g. Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate; Holt, Taylor, and Kelly, Protecting
Civilians; Sewall, Raymond, and Chin, Mass Atrocity Response Operations; Weir, The Last Line of
Defense; Giffen, Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit ; Report of the Secretary General on the Protection
of Civilians in Armed Conflict ; Cohen and Gingerich, Protect and Serve or Train and Equip;
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Stability Operations.
2Atama, Field Dispatch: South Kivu - No Peace in Sight ; Mahtani et al., Final Report of the
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Nienaber, Satellite Imagery Proves
Catastrophic Failure of Joint Rwanda/Congo Military Exercises; Congo Advocacy Coalition, DR
Congo: Civilian Cost of Military Operation is Unacceptable; Thomas-Jensen, Atama, and Caey-
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leverage to force the FARDC to refrain from abusing civilians, or refused to support
it, and that MONUC did not adequately defend civilians from predictable FDLR
reprisals — while endorsing the goal of eliminating the FDLR. Given the focus of
this criticism and the “on paper” promise of the Kimia II model, it is worth asking
what lessons can be learned from its failings. Was Kimia II a good idea poorly
executed? Or do the problems to which the operation gave rise indicate that the role
of military operations in protecting civilians needs further revision?
Though criticisms about execution are certainly valid, the level of violence against
civilians seen in Kimia II also represents a failure to take into account the ways in
which military operations change the dynamics of violence against civilians, and the
critics who endorsed the goal of eliminating the FDLR by force also seem to dismiss
that danger. We should not limit our concern just to the ways in which peacekeepers
can intercede in abuses of civilians, but also their role in (albeit unintentionally)
creating them. This requires a broader focus on the context of violence against
civilians, rather than just regarding such violence as an “external shock” to which
peacekeepers must respond.
Levels of violence in Kimia II in part reflected two aspects of MONUC’s approach.
First, military operations to eliminate the FDLR - a group that, for all its genocidal
past, seems more interested in controlling and exploiting populations than eradicat-
ing them - created incentives for increased abuse of civilians by both the FDLR and
the FARDC. This increased violence could have been much better contained and
mitigated, but not eliminated entirely, and the likelihood of such violence should be
considered when any operations aimed at “protecting civilians” are undertaken. Sec-
ond, the nature of MONUC’s mandate, and the particular way in which the FDLR’s
role was moralized, seems to have played a role in limiting the options that MONUC
(and outside analysts) are willing to contemplate for approaching the organization.
By trying to take the “moral high ground,” MONUC may actually be cutting off
options with much to morally recommend them.
Context of the Kimia II Operation
Here I will only provide some basic context about the Kimia II operations. For a
comprehensive (if in some places controversial) overview of the warfare in the DRC,
see Prunier (Africa’s World War).
maex, An Uneasy Alliance in Eastern Congo; Thomas-Jensen, The Counterinsurgency Debate: A
Tale of Two Countries; Sawyer and Van Woudenberg, You Will Be Punished ; Olson and Smith,
DR Congo: Protect Civilians and End Military Operations; Vircoulon, After MONUC.
3
The eastern DRC, particularly the Kivu provinces, have been the scene of bloody
conflict between forces of the national government and several paramilitary groups.
Two of the most powerful, most prominent, and best-organized groups were the
FDLR and the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). Both have
ties to the Rwandan genocide. The FDLR’s leadership is made up of members of
the Hutu-dominated former genocidal regime.3 The leader of the CNDP, Laurent
Nkunda, portrayed himself as a defender of Congolese Tutsis against further ethnic
violence, especially by the FDLR, and the group was widely believed to be supported
by the Rwandan government.4
From its inception until about the end of 2008, the CNDP seemed to present the
largest threat to the DRC government, and the FARDC even occasionally allied with
the FDLR against Nkunda’s group.5 But, in early 2009, following an apparent rap-
prochement between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, Nkunda was deposed
as head of the CNDP and arrested in Rwanda, and the CNDP were assimilated into
the FARDC through an “accelerated” process.6 While the integration process was
deeply imperfect, it cleared the way for ex-CNDP to fight alongside the FARDC to
defeat the FDLR.
The first outcome of this partnership was Umoja Wetu, a joint operation between
the FARDC and the Rwandan military. After Umoja Wetu ended in late February
2009, the FARDC began Kimia II, with backing from MONUC. MONUC provided
logistical, planning, and fire support to the FARDC, as well as rations.7 The aim
of both operations was to drive FDLR cadres out of their zones of control, and
disarm them (by force if necessary). The UN had been shut out of Umoja Wetu
planning, and so its support to Kimia II also represented an opportunity to exert
some more control over the course of anti-FDLR military operations.8 Kimia II ended
3African Rights, A Welcome Expression of Intent.
4See, e.g. McCrummen, “For Tutsis of Eastern Congo, Protector, Exploiter or Both?”; Inter-
national Crisis Group, Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, pp. 7—8; Kavanagh, “Five Million
Dead and Counting”; “Profile of DRCongo Dissident General Laurent Nkunda”; Stearns et al.,
Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, §27, 29, 61—68.
5International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, p. 14; Stearns et al., Final Report
of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, §§102-113.
6McCrummen, “Rwanda’s Arrest of Congolese Rebel Leader Marks a Key Shift”; Mahtani et
al., Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, §§20—24,
29—40; Mahtani et al., Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, §§180—199.
7Sawyer and Van Woudenberg, You Will Be Punished, p. 137; Twenty-Seventh Report of the
Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, §15.
8Sawyer and Van Woudenberg, You Will Be Punished, pp. 135—136.
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in December 2009.
The Dynamics of Civilian Attacks - Theory
Attacks on civilians escalated to distressing levels during Kimia II.9
Unfortunately, this effect on civilians was predictable. It is tempting to see vio-
lence against civilians as irrational savagery, especially in Africa where conflicts tend
to be portrayed as savage affairs anyway.10 But, as Sawyer and Van Woudenberg
(You Will Be Punished, p. 52) note, FDLR killings during Kimia II showed evidence
of being systematic and ordered by the command structure, and there are many rea-
sons why armed groups attack civilians — most of them rational if not moral; e.g.,
militants may
• have genocidal intentions toward a class of civilians11
• desire the land, livestock, or other material goods possessed by a civilian pop-
ulation (and so attack civilians to eliminate or drive off the population)
• use egregious violence against civilians to influence international public opinion,
either to draw attention to a conflict or convince international actors to back
down
• violently reinforce social norms such as gender dominance or racial hierarchy
• use violence as a means of in-group bonding
• callously attack civilians that another party is using as “human shields”
• attack civilians ostensibly under an enemy’s protection to undermine civilian
confidence in and loyalty to that enemy
• desire to ensure that civilians comply with the group’s demands (for food,
portage, “wives,” etc.) and do not collaborate with enemies, and use violence
as an incentive
9On absolute numbers, see Congo Advocacy Coalition, DR Congo: Civilian Cost of Military
Operation is Unacceptable; On escalation, e.g. Sawyer and Van Woudenberg, You Will Be Punished,
notes that rates of sexual violence doubled in 2009, during the operations.
10See, e.g. Gettleman, “Africa’s Forever Wars”.
11The legal definition of “genocide” applies only to the destruction of certain kinds of groups - I
intend this category to also cover genocide-like attacks made against groups that do not support a
legal finding of genocide, such as political, class, or gender groups.
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• attack civilians without any grand plan, because the leadership cannot or will
not constrain individual combatants who use violence against civilians to take
what they want, pursue personal vendettas, etc.
Of course, groups may attack civilians for different reasons in different contexts
(or even for multiple, overlapping or confused, reasons at once). And groups may
harm civilians without attacking them - the proverbial “collateral damage.” When
insufficient care has been taken to protect civilians from the effects of military action,
this unintentional harm to civilians may be just as immoral as a direct attack.12
Different motivations for violence give rise to different patterns of violence. A
group that abuses civilians to ensure compliance may be relatively benign so long as
it does not face significant challenges to its control. By contrast, when a genocidal
group gains stable control of a target population, it may seize the chance to begin
killing in earnest. Protecting civilians from violence also requires taking these dy-
namics into account when deploying military force - an issue not entirey captured
by a focus on doctrinal and tactical issues for defending civilians from ongoing or
imminent attacks. The point here is that how a military force acts may not only
affect their success in stopping attacks, but may have a profound impact on when
and whether those attacks occur at all.
Stathis Kalyvas (The Logic of Violence in Civil War) has analyzed the reasons
why groups that aim to control civilian populations use violence against civilians.
While direct violence against civilians is “indiscriminate” in the sense that it vio-
lates the standard jus in bello principle of discriminating between combatants and
civilians, it is often not “indiscriminate” in the sense of being randomly targeted.13
Armed groups interested in population control have strong incentives to avoid indis-
criminate violence.
First, while indiscriminate violence may engender fear, it also tends to create
anger and hatred, and so gives civilians an incentive to find ways to work with your
enemy, even if they were not previously aligned with them. Second, it may cow
a population, but if compliance does not bring safety (because violence does not
reliably target all and only non-compliant civilians), civilians will still have little
incentive to cooperate, especially at personal cost. When indiscriminate violence is
not an end in itself (as in genocide) it is likely to occur only when the side using
it is confident that civilians will not be able to defect to the other side and so will
cooperate in the interest of ending the fighting entirely; or when a strategy of control
12See Rodin, “Terrorism”.
13Unless otherwise indicated, I will follow Kalyvas in using the latter, descriptive rather than
normative, meaning.
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is combined with a different strategy of harming civilians on the theory that the
opponents’ concern for civilian well-being will cause them to hesitate.14
However, as Kalyvas himself notes, it is easy to overstate the level of indiscrimi-
nate violence in a conflict. Discriminate violence can be widespread, and indiscrim-
inate violence is not the same as badly targeted violence. An armed group may have
incentives to target all and only civilians who are cooperating with the enemy, yet
may find it very difficult to get accurate information about who those civilians are.
If it errs on the side of attacking suspected collaborators, many civilians may be
killed, including many who were not collaborators, without the violence being in-
discriminate. Where armed groups have poor intelligence, they may use geography
or ethnicity as crude proxies for collaboration with the enemy. In addition, groups
may adhere to views on collective responsibility that cause them to attack many in-
dividuals not directly involved in whatever defection they are trying to punish. This
may either be a way of punishing collaborators indirectly by targeting vulnerable
people they care about, or an expression of a genuine belief in collective guilt. We
should not confuse attacks on civilians that are immoral or wrong with attacks that
are untargeted. There is a big difference in the patterns of violence exhibited by a
group that will, say, kill everyone in a village as “collaborators” based on the fact
that government forces based nearby without resistance, and a group that will kill
everyone in a village because their goal is to wipe out the ethnic group that lives
there.
Dynamics of FDLR Violence During Kimia II
Despite the fact that the FDLR leadership are former genocidaires, they do not seem
to have had genocidal aims towards the Congolese population under their control.
The FDLR economically exploited civilians in all areas under their control, but also
served as a local authority in some areas, and intermarried with the local popu-
lation.15 The FDLR, like most insurgent groups, are not merely predators. They
require resources from the civilian population to survive and as a result have an in-
terest in maintaining the compliance of that population through a mixture of threats
and inducements.
During Kimia II, the stated reasons the FDLR gave for attacking civilians also
seemed consistent with the use of violence for control. The FDLR told victims
14Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, ch. 6, esp. pp. 160—171.
15Boshoff and Hoebeke, Peace in the Kivus, p. 3; Sawyer and Van Woudenberg, You Will Be
Punished, p. 51; Life and Peace Institute, Analyse de Dynamiques.
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before and/or during the attacks that they were being attacked for cooperating
with the FARDC, and internal records and conversations within the FDLR indi-
cate that attacks on civilians were intended as retaliation for perceived collaboration
and reprisals for FARDC/MONUC/Rwandan attacks on the FDLR.16 The fact that
attacks tended to focus on civilians in areas “cleared” by the FARDC and civilians
living near FARDC bases indicates that this public justification for the attacks was
not just a smokescreen for, e.g., genocide.
Most of the FDLR violence during Kimia II, catalogued most precisely in the
Human Rights Watch report, seems to have been at least semi-selective. The FDLR
punished entire villages for “collaboration” with the FARDC; collective punishment
may deter active collaborators who care about their neighbors and family members,
and village membership may be a proxy for collaboration. Both uses of violence
against civilians are strategically coherent and an outgrowth not only of a cavalier
attitude toward civilian life, but of poor information.17
Lack of information (assuming that callousness among FDLR leadership is a con-
stant) is crucial to understanding the spike in violence by the FDLR during Kimia II.
According to Kalyvas’ analysis, would-be-selective violence against civilians is likely
to increase in areas of transition. Where the FDLR was firmly in control, it had
little need for overt violence against civilians and good access to information about
FARDC collaborators; its stable control both let it get to know local civilians and
provide benefits in return for information. Where the FARDC or another group was
firmly in control, the FDLR could not effectivley bring violence to bear. But where
the FDLR was dominant, but not completely in control, it had strong incentives to
use violence against civilians, civilians had more opportunity and incentive to collab-
orate with the FARDC, but the FDLR lost the stable connection to the population
that would let it carefully target violence. This combination of strong incentives for
civilian defection, urgent need to deter defection, and poor ability to distinguish be-
tween defectors and other civilians is a potent recipe for widespread violence against
16Sawyer and Van Woudenberg, You Will Be Punished, pp. 51—57; Mahtani et al., Final Report
of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, §345—§396.
17Importantly, note that I am not implying that killing only active collaborators - people who
in fact provided some material support to the FARDC - would be morally acceptable. Leaving
aside any judgments about the relative merits of the FARDC and the FDLR, most civilian “col-
laborators” in situations like this have little choice in the matter - if the FDLR, or the FARDC,
or whomever, shows up and demands food, reasonable people will comply. Holding the relatively
powerless responsible for the consequences of their lack of power is morally perverse, an insight
that is at the moral heart of the idea that civilians should be protected, even once we drop the




The structure of violence against civilians in control cases is symmetrical — not
only insurgents use violence against civilians to ensure compliance and deter defec-
tion. Despite the 2006 elections, it would be näıve to think that Congolese were
by default inclined to respect and cooperate with the government, especially in ar-
eas where the FDLR or other militia groups had provided some quasi-governmental
services, had demonstrated their willingness and ability to harm civilians who coop-
erated with the government, and where the government had not proven its will and
ability to protect people from harm. So, the government forces had strong incentives
to use violence against civilians to secure control as they moved in, balanced only
by any personal committments they may have had to protection of civilians (likely
weak in the divided DRC) and the leverage of MONUC (which it could probably have
made more of). Even highly disciplined militaries with a deeply ingrained culture
of respect for civilians engage in unfortunate abuses of civilians when taking control
of an area, and it is inexcusable but also unsurprising that the FARDC attacked
civilians during Kimia II (often for the same stated reasons as the FDLR, including
“punishment” for collaboration).
The ex-CNDP members of the FARDC may also have introduced an asymme-
try not to civilians’ benefit. While the FDLR seems more interested in looting or
dominating populations under its control than killing or driving them off, ex-CNDP
elements of the FARDC have been accused of using military operations as cover to
clear areas for settlement by Tutsi (either Rwandans or Congolese Tutsi who fled
to Rwanda).19 If these accusations are true, civilians in areas taken by ex-CNDP
FARDC units from FDLR units would face a double threat - violence associated
with an attempt to hold onto population control by retreating FDLR, followed by
differently motivated violence aimed at driving them out once the ex-CNDP FARDC
had control.
Taking Sides
The approach taken by MONUC and the FARDC was one that was likely to increase
FDLR abuses against civilians. Even had MONUC done all that it could to protect
civilians from attack, the strategy of Kimia II and the logic of control was highly likely
to inspire greater violence against civilians. Anti-civilian violence by control-oriented
groups will be highest in areas where one group is dominant but not in complete
18Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, ch. 7.
19Stearns, MONUC Internal Report About ex-CNDP Killings.
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control; other things equal, therefore, creating more asymmetrically contested areas
is likely to increase overall violence against civilians, in the short term.
Both the FARDC and MONUC seem to have made FDLR “strongholds” a high
priority. After the conclusion of Kimia II, one of the key boasts of the FARDC’s
spokesman for the operation, Maj. Ekenge, was that “all the FDLR strongholds
have been dismantled.”20 Toward the end of the operation, I asked a member of the
MONUC military leadership whether areas of relatively stable FDLR control made
a military priority, and was told that areas of strong and stable FDLR control were
struck first where possible.21 Given the goal of forcibly disarming the FDLR, the
strategy makes sense. Leaving the FDLR in a position of de facto governance was
not an option, so eventually those strongholds needed to be attacked and control
given to the DRC government.
Critics generally accepted that the operation’s heart was in the right place. The
Congo Advocacy Coalition (DR Congo: Civilian Cost of Military Operation is Unac-
ceptable) maintained that “disarming the FDLR militia should remain a top priority
for the Congolese government and UN peacekeepers,” and the Enough project’s
Colin Thomas-Jensen (The Counterinsurgency Debate: A Tale of Two Countries)
argued that “the motivation for the Congolese-UN offensive against [the FDLR]...
is generally sound.” One of International Crisis Group’s (Congo: Five Priorities for
a Peacebuilding Strategy, p. ii) key recommendations was that MONUC, the DRC,
and Rwanda, “[s]uspend Operation Kimya II and plan new joint military operations
against the FDLR. . . ” (emphasis mine).
MONUC’s own mandate reinforced a focus on eliminating the FDLR. While
much is made of the fact that MONUC’s mandate at the time of Kimia II made
the protection of civilians the absolute top priority, that is only partially correct
and may be misleading. MONUC’s mandate made the “protection of civilians...
under imminent threat of violence” its top priority, listing it as (a) on the ordered
list of mission tasks in paragraph 3, and re-emphasizing this priority in paragraph
6.22 Interpretation of MONUC’s mandate, both within the mission and by outside
analysts, is complicated. But taken literally, the language of imminent threat makes
this a fairly limited priority. Broader operations to “prevent attacks on civilians and
disrupt the military capability of illegal armed groups that continue to use violence,”
are relegated to priority (f), and mentioned after deterring threats to the Goma and
Nairobi peace processes. MONUC might have been obliged to “drop everything”
20“After Operation Kimia II: MONUC Outlines Cooperation with FARDC in Operation Amani
Leo”.
21Confidential interview with a MONUC military officer, Goma (DRC), November 2009
22United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1856 (2008).
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if any of its forces were confronted with civilians under direct attack, but was not
required to arrange its operations so that it was likely to be so confronted — in fact,
were (e.g.) MONUC to react to the general threat posed to civilians by the FDLR
by devoting resources to protecting outlying villages on the border of FDLR zones
of control at the expense of the protection of UN facilities in more secure areas like
Goma it arguably would have been in violation of its mandate.
Of particular interest is the fact that MONUC’s mandate made protection of
the Nairobi and Goma peace processes of equal priority with protecting civilians.23
While both processes were arguably dead by the time of Kimia II, their spirit seems
to have shaped MONUC’s approach. What is not immediately obvious from reading
MONUC’s mandate is that both agreements/peace processes exclude the FDLR and
define it as a clear enemy.
The Nairobi Communique24 was an agreement between the governments of the
DRC and Rwanda to “address the threat posed. . . by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe.”25.
The DRC undertakes to “[l]aunch military operations. . . to dismantle the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
as a genocidal military organization in the DRC.”
The Goma peace negotiations issued an Acte d’Engagement in January 2008
signed by representatives of armed groups active in the Eastern DRC.26 The FDLR
were not signatories to the Acte, and in fact were “foreign forces” explicitly excluded
from the agreement it represented. The Technical Commitee on Peace and Security
established by the Acte was charged with “beginning the implementation of the plan
issued in the Nairobi joint communiqué on the disarmament and repatriation of for-
eign armed groups.”27 This task was linked to the cease-fire and to the integration
of rebel forces into the FARDC, the details of which were to be worked out “tak-
ing account of the presence of foreign armed groups referred to by the Nairobi joint
communiqué.” While the FDLR were not parties to this agreement and could not
technically violate it, since the elimination of the FDLR was tied to the demobiliza-
tion of other armed groups in the Acte - and, in fact, it is likely that the CNDP were
only brought to the table by the prospect of eliminating the FDLR - any resistance
to demobilization and repatriation would clearly “threaten” the Goma process in the
23Or perhaps higher; both are in priority f, but the peace processes are mentioned first.
24African Rights, A Welcome Expression of Intent, pp. 84—88.
25Because the FDLR’s core and leadership are made up of members of the Rwandese Armed
Forces (known by the French acronym FAR) under the genocidal regime and the interahamwe
paramilitaries that helped carry out the genocide, “ex-FAR” or “ex-Interahamwe” are sometimes
used to refer to the FDLR and allied/spin-off groups such as the RUD/URUNANA.
26Acte d’Engagment.
27All translations from the French are the author’s.
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meaning of MONUC’s mandate.28
MONUC’s mandate clearly aligned it with the government of the DRC and
against the FDLR. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is worth taking note of,
because it represents a trend in UN thinking that I believe has been very influential
in the development of the civilian protection discussion. Secondly, because the per-
spective it embodies may be the best one in some circumstances, but it constrains
policy options and comes with moral costs.
MONUC’s mandate seems to represent an instance of the kind of new thinking
about the impartiality principle expressed in the “Brahimi Report,” which is one of
the foundational documents of contemporary peacekeeping: “impartiality is not the
same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases. . . In some cases, local
parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peace-
keepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled
to do so.”29 In fact, part of what makes Kimia II interesting is that, at first glance,
it may seem like a perfect example of the new concept of impartiality. I suspect that
this is why critics of Kimia II criticize its cost and not its aims. Kimia II may have
been a poorly executed operation, but the basic problem from the perspective that
the UN ought to take a forceful stance against the worst human rights abusers is
how to undertake future Kimia-II-like operations without the human costs of this
one. Thomas-Jensen (The Counterinsurgency Debate: A Tale of Two Countries) is
particularly clear on this point — his hope is that the UN will learn from counterin-
surgency doctrine, especially the clear-hold-build approach that would help protect
civilians from reprisals.30
This perspective may show “moral clarity,” but it constrains options by taking a
side in the conflict. Both the FARDC and the FDLR threatened civilians. MONUC
could have treated these abuses equivalently, taking similar actions to prevent or
punish them. But it would be difficult to do so under the mandate the mission was
given.
The FDLR are defined as a threat to the peace by the mandate. Their abuses of
civilians are further reason to eliminate the group - integration or accomodation, on
the model offered to other rebel groups in the eastern DRC, is not an option. The
Nairobi/Goma agreements and MONUC strategy did not necessarily make enemies
28On elimination of the FDLR as a condition of CNDP participation, see Boshoff and Hoebeke,
Peace in the Kivus.
29Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations, §50.
30One problem with Kimia II was that the FARDC drove FDLR forces out of areas but was not
able to securely hold the areas and prevent militants from returning.
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of individual FDLR members - the Nairobi agreement makes provisions for disarming
and demobilizing them, and then resettling them in the DRC or repatriating them
to Rwanda as appropriate. But the organization as a whole is to be eliminated, and
their abuse of civilians makes the task more morally urgent.
On the other hand, the mandate makes MONUC a partner of the DRC gov-
ernment and thus the FARDC. Abuses by the FARDC are condemned, but are not
conceived of as a reason to eliminate those forces – they are reasons for reform. Some
of the critics cited suggested that the UN should have refused to support the Kimia
II operation, or at least used the threat of withdrawing support to force the FDLR
to behave better and prevent the involvement of known abusers.
One might reasonably ask whether there is anything wrong with this approach.
The FARDC are abusers but are also the government. Taking a more “robust” stance
toward the FARDC would threaten the mandate, the consent of the government
necessary to the mission, and the legitimacy of the 2006 elections. At least post-
2006, there is no way the UN could have contemplated an operation to coercively
disarm and demobilize the FARDC - or any armed group, such as the CNDP, that
had integrated with it. It is not clear how MONUC’s military could have protected
civilians directly from the FARDC. Enforcing a separation between the FARDC
and civilians either by creating civilian protected areas (or allowing large numbers of
civilians to seek shelter with UN forces) would have been counterproductive, since the
aim of the operation was not just to kill, capture, or disarm FDLR combatants, but
to transfer areas to FARDC (and government) control. The FARDC took advantage
of the close contact with and power over civilians required by this goal to abuse
them, but unless MONUC were willing to deny the FARDC such control — which
would amount to vetoing Kimia II by force — its ability to defend against abuses was
similarly limited. It may have been possible to “embed” MONUC forces so deeply
in the FARDC operation as to prevent abuses on an individualized basis — i.e., to
have MONUC personnel fighting alongside and entering villages alongside FARDC,
and stepping in directly when an abuse of a civilian looked likely. I could imagine
such an approach working, if the resources were available to so thoroughly integrate
and the trust between the government of the DRC and MONUC were absolute. But
even so, note how different this would be from any approach that looked reasonable
for approaching the FDLR. The FDLR, on the other hand, are not only abusers, but
reject the democratically elected government and are led by participants in the 1994
Rwandan genocide.
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The Image of the “Total Spoiler”
Could the UN have given even-handed support, if even-handed disengagement was
not feasible — i.e., tried to engage with and reform the FDLR, as it has done with the
FARDC? Practically, maybe (and only maybe), but the dominant moral perspective
taken on the FDLR by both the UN and outside observers barred this approach.
In terms of Stedman’s influential typology (“Spoiler Problems in Peace Pro-
cesses”), the FDLR were defined as “total spoilers.” Spoilers believe that “peace. . . threatens
their power, worldview, and interests,” while “average citizens have the most to lose
if war is renewed.” And, “[w]hen spoilers succeed... the results are catastrophic.”
Total spoilers “pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority and hold
immutable preferences. . . [and] often espouse radical ideologies.” The FDLR seems
to fit — they are willing to use extreme violence and subscribe to a totalizing ideol-
ogy that causes them to make demands that cannot be accomodated (in particular,
return of the ex-genocidaire leadership to political power in Rwanda). Defining the
FDLR in this absolute and moralized way fits the moralized understanding of im-
partiality mentioned above. Total spoilers cannot be accommodated, appeased, or
socialized — they must be marginalized or destroyed.31 The reasons for this “must”
are supposed to be both practical (they won’t respond to incentives) and moral (the
incentives they want are immoral to grant).
According to this picture, nothing is worse for civilians than the persistence of
spoiler groups. This may seem self-evident, given the fact that spoilers (by definition)
want to continue the war, but war is not an undifferentiated realm of slaughter. While
the FDLR controls significant terrain in the eastern DRC, it makes sense to say that
the war there is not over - but life is very different for a civilian living in an area
that is under stable FDLR control than for one living in a contested area with open
fighting. This is not to paint a rosy picture — at best civilians are exposed to
“taxation,” random criminal violence, poor infrastructure, and the like. But it is to
make the point that civilians might reasonably prefer some versions of continued war
to some attempts to make peace (and not just because they share a mad ideological
vision with combatants).
Secondly, it paints a demonic picture of total spoilers. Conceiving of groups as
irreconcilable is common despite the way in which those images are routinely over-
turned - e.g., in the DRC, the FARDC collaborated with the FDLR when the CNDP
was treated as the greatest threat (and a total spoiler, unwilling to compromise), and
then the FARDC and the CNDP integrated (somewhat) to fight the FDLR. Prefer-
ences are rarely completely immutable. And “radical ideology” does not necessarily
31Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, pp. 11,15.
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imply that a group cannot be compromised with, because radical ideology tends to
be the province mainly of the group’s elites, not of its mass membership. Secondly,
even elites often seem to act in ways that reveal more motivation than single-minded
obsession. After all, the leaders of the FDLR may be genocidaires, but they have
also been getting rich and making lives in the DRC and abroad. Even if they were
given all they ask in terms of an “inter-Rwandan dialogue” and a return to some
political power in Rwanda, they would be unlikely to be able to “finish the job” of
the 1994 genocide — but it might be a very good way to ensure that they remain
rich and powerful. Finally, “radical ideology” is an unhelpful category — Western
states contain many groups with what could be called “radical ideologies,” without
breaking: the Amish, white supremacists, anarchists, fascists, the Westboro Baptist
Church, Dominionists, etc. Some of these groups even have radical ideologies that
espouse violence. But their violence is controlled by the state where appropriate, and
they are either integrated or marginalized in ways that minimally threaten overall
social structure and governance. The problem with spoilers with radical ideologies is
that they are spoilers, not that they have radical ideologies. It is at least conceivable
that one could change the former without changing the latter.
Does this general reflection that “total” spoilers may not be so total entail that
a “kumbaya” moment was possible or appropriate with the FDLR specifically? Of
course not. It might have been, but making that decision would require a detailed
analysis of the conflict beyond what I can give here. My concern is that the approach
to the conflict, especially as reflected in MONUC’s 2008 mandate, ruled it out. The
result was to force MONUC into a position where it was highly likely to be pushed
to back military operations that were inevitably going to threaten civilians. Aside
from any analysis of the FDLR as totally implacable (which, given their previous
alliance with the FARDC and the inclusion of other groups with similar infamy in
the Goma Acte, seems a bit implausible), there seem to be two reasons why it might
seem that eliminating the FDLR is the only option available. The first is dangerous,
but perhaps realistic, and the second is wrong.
The first is that the integration of the CNDP militia and DRC-Rwanda reconcil-
iation may have been contingent on a hard line toward the FDLR. The war in the
DRC has always been regionalized, and Rwanda has been a major player from the
start. Reconciliation between the DRC and Rwanda is probably a prerequisite for
ever ending the violence. I must admit that this may be a good reason for accepting
the violence against civilians sure to accompany even the best-executed approach to
coercively disarming the FDLR. We should accept such a conclusion only with great
regret, though — only the level of catastrophe that the violence in the DRC has been
for civilians makes it plausible that accepting some additional violence in the name
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of ending it would be justified. And even then, before condoning it, we should be
very, very certain that it will work.
The second, and the one that seems to dominate advocacy discussions here in the
US, is that the leadership of the FDLR are genocidaires and abusers, and forcible
disarmament is the only way they will be brought to justice. Any sort of compromise
or accomodation with the group is likely to end with the leaders either retiring into
comfortable exile or having positions of influence in the DRC or Rwanda. This
seems odious, and it is. But we should ask ourselves if the massive civilian cost of
operations against the FDLR would be justified by the goal of bringing the leaders
to justice. Some strict moralists might say “yes,” but I think it is hard to maintain
that judgment and take the situation seriously — it is a very harsh deontology that
would say to one of hundreds of civilians raped or killed during Kimia II that this is
obligatory to avenge past misdeeds. In fact, it verges on behavior that would make
the FARDC and MONUC “spoilers” with a “radical ideology” — an ideologically
radically committed to justice, which may be noble, but radical nonetheless. If we put
it starkly, and ask if we ought to be willing to countenance violence against hundreds
if not thousands of civilians, so that leaders of the FDLR will get their just desserts,
I think a moral logic of proportionality would say “no.” Proportionality sometimes
does mean that one lets evil go unpunished because the costs of accountability are
too great.
Beyond Kimia II, an asymmetric approach to civilian abuses is likely to be a fea-
ture of any “robust” peacekeeping approach, especially as they approach the border
with counterinsurgency. Except in cases where the UN is willing and able to estab-
lish a transitional administration, a local state is going to be a necessary partner
for any emergence from conflict.32 Once a peace process is in place, and especially
if state-legitimating political processes like elections have taken place, intervening
forces (including the UN) will need, to some extent, to choose a side. The moral ide-
als of treating all harms to civilians equally, of being willing to respond to the most
serious abuses with force (both for effect and a sense of justice), and of extending
the legitimate rule of a state are not likely to all point in the same direction.
Implications for Civilian Protection
What does this all mean for MONUC, or for interventions in general?
Coercively disarming groups with stable control over a population requires phe-
nomenal resources, especially if military assets will also be used to protect civilians
32And transitional administrations have an uneven history See Chesterman (You, the People).
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from reprisals and to monitor local partners. This is not just a matter of calling
for more UN troops or stronger mandates. The US experience in Afghanistan and
Iraq should be a cautionary example - the US has access to resources far beyond
what the UN or a regional actor (such as the AU) could expect to have, especially in
terms of the ratio of resources to population/geographic area to be controlled, and as
fully admitted counterinsurgency missions, US (and coalition) forces have maximum
permission to use force. Despite this, both efforts have dragged on years longer than
initially planned for, and the US has been plauged both by confidence-undermining
attacks on civilians by its enemies and by abuses by its own forces and local partners.
Rather than look for ways to bring to bear perhaps unrealistic levels of resources to
support a strategy of legitimizing a central government as early as practicable and
then using force to back up a disarmament process for “spoilers,” we should at least
consider whether that is the wrong model.
In a certain sense, the aggressive approach treats both spoilers and the govern-
ment as apolitical. The government, especially a democratic one, is conceived of
as basically on the side of the people but in need of some reform by non-coercive
pressure where it does not live up to that ideal. Spoilers, especially total spoilers,
are not really part of a political process since they have rejected peace, and peace is
what the people clearly want.
A different approach would be to treat areas controlled by spoilers who provide
some governance (even if not up to moral standards) seriously as small political
entities, and the government’s legitimacy as a process that cannot be considered es-
tablished by any fairly sharp event, like an election. Just as UN forces (and civilians)
work with government forces like the FARDC to improve their respect for human
rights and civil-military relations, the UN could work with spoiler militias to en-
sure that they extracted resources in a more humane manner and conducted their
military operations with greater respect for civilians. If this seems hopelessly näıve,
I am not saying that it is clearly better in all cases, or that it has no moral and
practical problems. But the costs of the approach of eliminating spoilers by force are
heavy, and so should at least be weighed against other heavy costs. Taking such an
approach toward spoilers legitimates them to some extent. But, if they have even
ambiguous and partly coerced support of civilians, they may in fact deserve some
degree of cautious, limited legitimacy. “Making looting more humane” may seem like
an oxymoron, but we should not place too much weight on the moral divide between
looting and taxation backed with the force of law — there is a continuum here, not a
sharp distinction. Integrating quasi-political units based on spoilers into a state will
inevitably be difficult, and pressure should be strong to get them to rein in practices
that thrive only in conflict in favor of the benefits of some kind of legitimacy. But
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it is not clear a priori that integration on the basis of some legitimation will always
be more difficult or more morally costly than forceful elimination.
For a case in point, consider the Renamo insurgency in Mozambique.33 Renamo
was a brutal group, known for the mutilation of civilians and often accused of having
no political program aside from destabilizing Mozambique on behalf of Rhodesia
(now Zimbabwe) and later apartheid-era South Africa. Nonetheless, it was brought
into both the peace process and ultimately became a responsible partner in the post-
war government, largely through UN support to its development as a political party.
Granted, Renamo accepted a role in the peace process, but peace processes are not
ideal forums of justice, and so that should not be a moral divide where terrible human
rights abuses were not.
Two final points. First, this does not rule out a military solution; it just changes
the options. If MONUC were treating the FDLR as a governing group to be accom-
modated and absorbed or integrated eventually, while being reformed in the nearer
term, it might still engage in military operations aimed at containment or zone
protection. The military priorities might be reversed however, given the dynamics
of violence against civilians — rather than seeking to drive the FDLR out of its
strongholds, military operations would be used to prevent attempts to expand zones
of control (with the attendant incentives to abuse civilians) and to secure contested
areas (probably with a bias towards securing them in the government’s favor).
Second, it does require biting the bullet on accountability, to some extent. Per-
haps at a future date, a stable DRC would prosecute FDLR leaders. But perhaps
not. If we are willing to swallow the FARDC’s quite serious abuses, I see no reason
not to do the same for the FDLR, for similar reasons.34
Conclusion
My argument in this essay is really fairly limited. First, I hope to have established
that patterns of civilian abuse are not generally exogenous to military strategies -
especially when, as in the case of the FDLR, abusers are motivated in substantial
33See Vines, Renamo.
34Nor is this merely a position held by academic fools like myself. I had the opportunity to
discuss these issues (confidentially) with a member of MONUC’s civilian political affairs staff. He
told me that the UN’s official policy was not to negotiate with the FDLR, but there were many
in the mission who felt that the time for compromise had come. He characterized this a conflict
between wanting to do the principled thing of refusing to work with genocidaires and practicality;
I would only argue that there is principle in being willing to privilege the concrete well-being of
vulnerable people over abstract justice.
18
part by a desire to control rather than eliminate the population. Second, that peace-
keeping missions can get boxed in to strategies that threaten to change the dynamics
to the cost of civilians by an overly moralized picture of the conflict - the option of
working with armed factions to reform them as political military units should be
taken off the table only after carefully assessing the likely civilian cost of eliminating
them, rather than ruling it out on principle because they are abusers or “total spoil-
ers.” In the end, the only option for the DRC and situations like it may be using
military force to crush groups like the FDLR - but we should not rush into such a
risky strategy out of a desire to seize the moral high ground, regardless of cost.
References
Acte d’Engagment. Jan. 2008. url: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/KIVUACT23
JAN08.PDF (visited on 07/10/2010).
African Rights. A Welcome Expression of Intent: The Nairobi Communique and the
Ex-FAR/Interahamwe. Kigali, Rwanda: African Rights, 2007.
“After Operation Kimia II: MONUC Outlines Cooperation with FARDC in Opera-
tion Amani Leo”. In: MONUC News 249 (Jan. 7, 2010).
Atama, Noel. Field Dispatch: South Kivu - No Peace in Sight. Enough Project. Dec.
2009. url: http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/south-kivu-no-
peace-sight (visited on 06/14/2010).
Boshoff, Henri and Hans Hoebeke. Peace in the Kivus? An Analysis of the Nairobi
and Goma Agreements. July 2008. url: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/
SITREPDRC310708.PDF (visited on 07/10/2010).
Chesterman, Simon. You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administra-
tions, and Statebuilding. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2005.
Cohen, Marc J. and Tara R. Gingerich. Protect and Serve or Train and Equip? US
Security Assistance and Protection of Civilians. Boston, MA: Oxfam America,
2009.
Congo Advocacy Coalition. DR Congo: Civilian Cost of Military Operation is
Unacceptable. Nov. 2009. url: http : / / www . oxfamamerica . org / press /
pressreleases/dr- congo- civilian- cost- of- military- operation- is-
unacceptable (visited on 07/21/2010).
Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Africa’s Forever Wars”. In: Foreign Policy (Mar. 2010).
Giffen, Alison. Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit: Developing Guidance to Prevent and
Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians. Washington, DC:
The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010.
19
Headquarters, Department of the Army. Stability Operations. Field Manual FM3-07.
Washington, DC: United States Army, 2008.
Holt, Victoria K. and Tobias C. Berkman. The Impossible Mandate? Military Pre-
paredness, the Responsibility to Protect, and Modern Peace Operations. Washing-
ton, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.
Holt, Victoria K., Glyn Taylor, and Max Kelly. Protecting Civilians in the Context
of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks, and Remaining Challenges.
New York, NY: United Nations, 2009.
International Crisis Group. Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu. Africa Report 133.
Nairobi, Kenya and Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2007.
— Congo: Consolidating the Peace. Africa Report 128. International Crisis Group,
2007.
— Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy. Africa Report No. 150.
Nairobi, Kenya and Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2009.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
Kavanagh, Michael J. “Five Million Dead and Counting”. In: Slate (Nov. 14, 2008).
Life and Peace Institute. Analyse de Dyanmiques Locales de Cohabitation Avec
Groupes Armes FDLR a Bunyakiri, Hombo Nord, Hombo Sud et Chambucha.
Field Report. Life and Peace Institute, 2007.
Mahtani, Dinesh et al. Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. UN Document S/2009/603. United Nations, 2009.
— Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
UN Document S/2009/253. 2009.
McCrummen, Stephanie. “For Tutsis of Eastern Congo, Protector, Exploiter or
Both?” In: Washington Post (Aug. 6, 2007).
— “Rwanda’s Arrest of Congolese Rebel Leader Marks a Key Shift; Conflict Has
Plagued Region Since 1994”. In: Washington Post (Jan. 24, 2009), A8.
Nienaber, Georgianne. Satellite Imagery Proves Catastrophic Failure of Joint
Rwanda/Congo Military Exercises. Nov. 2009. url: http : / / www .
huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/satellite-imagery-proves_
b_318160.html (visited on 06/14/2010).
Olson, Camilla and Jennifer Smith. DR Congo: Protect Civilians and End Mil-
itary Operations. Sept. 2009. url: http : / / www . refugeesinternational .
org/policy/field-report/dr-congo-protect-civilians-end-military-
operations (visited on 07/21/2010).
20
Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations. UN Document A/55/305 - S/2000/809. New York:
United Nations, 2000.
“Profile of DRCongo Dissident General Laurent Nkunda”. In: BBC Worldwide Mon-
itoring (Sept. 6, 2007).
Prunier, Gerard. Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Mak-
ing of a Continental Catastrophe. New York: Oxford UP, 2008.
Report of the Secretary General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
UN Document S/2009/277. United Nations, 2009.
Rodin, David. “Terrorism Without Intention”. In: Ethics 114 (4 2004), pp. 752–771.
Sawyer, Ida and Anneke Van Woudenberg. “You Will Be Punished:” Attacks on
Civilians in Eastern Congo. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2009.
Sewall, Sarah, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin. Mass Atrocity Response Operations:
A Military Planning Handbook. Cambridge, MA: Harvard College, 2010.
Slim, Hugo. Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War. New York,
NY: Columbia University Press, 2008.
Stearns, Jason. MONUC Internal Report About ex-CNDP Killings. Nov. 6, 2009.
url: http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2009/11/monuc-internal-report-
about-ex-cndp.html (visited on 07/21/2010).
Stearns, Jason et al. Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. UN Document S/2008/773. 2008.
Stedman, Stephen John. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”. In: International
Security 22.2 (1997), pp. 5 –53.
Thomas-Jensen, Colin. The Counterinsurgency Debate: A Tale of Two Countries.
Sept. 2009. url: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/colin-thomasjensen/
the-counterinsurgency-deb_b_301649.html (visited on 06/14/2010).
Thomas-Jensen, Colin, Noel Atama, and Olivia Caeymaex. An Uneasy Alliance in
Eastern Congo. Enough Project. Sept. 2009. url: http://www.enoughproject.
org/publications/Uneasy-Alliance#_ednref9 (visited on 06/14/2010).
Twenty-Seventh Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN Document S/2009/160.
United Nations, 2009.
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1856 (2008). UN Document
S/RES/1856 (2008). New York, NY: United Nations, 2008.
Vines, Alex. Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique. New Jersey:
Centre for Southern Africa Studies, 1996.
Vircoulon, Thierry. After MONUC, Should MONUSCO Continue to Support Con-




congolese-military-campaigns.aspx (visited on 07/21/2010).
Weir, Erin A. The Last Line of Defense: How Peacekeepers Can Better Protect Civil-
ians. Washington, DC: Refugees International, 2010.
22
